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1.  A conference. like this, organized by  a  private-
sector body,  "The  Economist",  allows  participants  to  step outside 
their official  role  for  a  time,  and  to  speak  their  mind  informally. 
So  I  propose  t~ give  you  my  personal  views  on  relations  with  Japan, 
and  hope  yQu  ~ill give yours  in  the  discussio~ afterwards. 
Experience  of  recent  years  .... 
2.  In  the  five years  I  have  been  in the  Commission  of 
the  European  Communities,  ~e  hav~ had  very  little  suc~ess  in  trying 
to  change  our  ~jlationship with  Japan.  When  l  joined the  Commission, 
the problem  of  ~he trade  imbalance  with  Japan  was  already of  long 
standing. 
3.  Our  Japanese  friends  always  say  one  should not  look 
at bilateral  trade balances,  because  thes~ are only part of  the global 
trading  equation.  I  agree  with  that  in  theory.  The  overall  system 
is supposed  to  ~e  self-correcting~ but  when  two  of  the biggest  partners 
have,  over  many  years,  an  ever-more-serious  imbalance,  something .is 
wrong  with  the  $ystem.  That  is  the  first  thing  we  ~ave been  trying 
to  get  our  Jap~nese partners  to  recognize  :  the  system  itself is not 
working  correc~ly.  The  second  thing  we  want  them  to decide  is  that 
palliatives are not  enough,  and  that  major  corrective action  is needed 
on  their side,  as  well  as  "more  effort" on  ours. 2
We  all  know  that trade  figures  can  give  a  different 
impression  according  to  the various  sources  and  definition.  In parti-
cular,  the  valuation of  imports  to  include  freight  and  insurance  always 
makes  the  picture  seem  worse  to  the  country  with  more  imports.  So  let 
us  take  Japanese  customs  clearance  figures,  which  give the  most  modest  ·- view  of  the  imbalance. 
5.  After  t~e first oil shock  in  1973,  the  Community's 
trade deficit  with  Japan  doubled  1n  tw~-and-half years,  reaching  about 
4.4 billion u.s.  dollars  in  1976.  By  the  middle  of  1980,  it  had  doubled 
... 
again,  and  in  1981  was  about  10  billion dollars,  and  still growing. 
6.  At  this  level,  Japan  gains  almost  as  big  a  surplus 
from  trade  with  the  Com~~nity as  it does  from  trade  with  the other 
major  partner,  the  United  States;  with  this difference,  however,  - that 
the total  value  of two-way  trade  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  is 
. 
more  than double  the  value of  Japan-EC  trade. 3
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7.  It  is not  merely  the  size of the  imbalance  that 
points  to  a  structural  problem,  but  also the composition of Japan's 
imports.  It  is  no  argument  to  say  that  the percentage  is  low  because 
of Japan's  high  imports  of energy  and  raw  materials.  The  Community 
also  imports  large amounts  of energy  and  raw  materials.  In  any  event, 
one  can  eliminate the  effect of other  imports  by  looking  at  manufactured 
imports  per  head  of population.  Japan  imported  about  260  dollars-worth 
of manufactures  ~n 1980,  while  the  Community  imported  about  625  dollars-
worth.  ·. 
8.  ·Sometimes  we  still hear  the objection that  Japan  is 
too  good  at  most  kinds  of manufacturing  to  need  any  imports.  However, 
•· 
we  have  known,  ever  since  David  Ricardo  explained it in this city 
170  years  ago,  that  a  nation will  still  gain  from  trade,  even  if it 
is more  efficient  in all  products  than  all  its partners;  by  specialising 
where  it  is~  efficient,  and  importing  other products.  JGpanese 
officials,  industrialists and  consumers  still seem  to  need  to  convince 
themselves  that  increased  imports  and  international  spec~alisation will 
actually enrich Japan,  as  well  as  the rest of the  world. 
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Absence  of  Community  policy 
9.  The  Community  would  undoubtedly  have  had  more  success 
in putting  accross  this message  if it had  adopted  a  genuinely  united 
trade policy  towards  Japun.  Despite  repeated proposals  from  the  •··  Commission  for  a  common  approach,  the  Member  States  have  generally 
preferred to  rely on  their  individual bilateral contacts  with  Japan 
to try to  extract  some  advantage,  narrowly  defined,  for  themselves. 
10.  If the balance-sheet  were  now  to  be  drawn  up  with 
ruthless  honesty,  those  individual  Member  States  would  have  to  admit 
that their bilateral  efforts have  brought  them  little or nothing  beyond 
•  what  could  have  been -achieved  through  common  negotiations. 
11.  This  bilateralism is all very  regrettable,  and  no 
•, 
significant  and  lasting  improvement·  is  likely so  long  as  it persists; 
but  what  I  find  even  more  astonishing  is  that  some  people  in  the 
Japanese  administration and  industry  seem  to cling  to  the notion that 
it is  in  Japan's  interest  to  keep  the  Community  divided.  I  have  the 
impression  that  they  are becoming  less  numerous  or  less  vocal;  but  if 
there  are  any  left,  I  would  say  to  them  that there  will  be  !!2. 
liberalisation of existing national  quantitative restrictions on 5
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Japanese trade,  but  probably  new  restrictions;  little or  no  increased 
scope  for  industrial  co-operation;  and  therefore,  little or  no 
reduction  in trade  friction  in the  long  term,  unless  it is done  on  a 
Community-wide  basis. 
What  to  do  about  it ? 
12.  That  brings  us  to the operative·question  :  what 
13. 
should the  Community  do  next  ?  One  possibility is to  adopt  a  policy 
of  confrontation  :  eliminate  the  trade  imbalance,  by  restricting total 
imports  from  Japan  to  a  level  equal  to our  own  exports  to  Japan.  This 
is plausible,  but  suicidal  in  view  of the  wave  of trade  restrictions 
that  would  be  adopted  everywhere  else.  Unfortunately,  I  cannot  escape 
the grim  thought  that  individuals,  and  even  nations,  may  in  fact  commit 
suicide,  if they  are pyt  under  too  much  stress.  Democracies  are  rather 
more  at  risk  in this  regard  than ·many  people  realise. 
If  we  rej~ct  confrontation - an  eye  for  an  eye,  a 
tooth  for  a  tooth  -what  can  we  say  about  a  policy of  industrial  co-
operation  ?  I  am  in··.favour  of  such  a  policy,  but  not  at  any  price. 
It must  be  c6-operation ~f  a-.kj~d  th~t holds  the promise  of  a  change 
in the old  EC-JJpan  rclJtionships.  It  is fairly  easy  to  say  what  is 
undesirable  :  for  example  there  would  be  little to be  gained  from  a 6 I 
~ ! ' 
; 
.  'f 
·. 
I 
i  I  .. 
.•  I 
f. 
;  . : 
Absence  of  Community  policy 
9.  The  Community  would  undoubtedly  have  had  more  success 
in putting  accross  this message  if it had  adopted  a  genuinely  united 
trade policy  towards  Japan.  Despite  repeated proposals  from  the 
Commission  for  a  common  approach,  the  Member  States  have  generally 
preferred to  rely  on  their  individual  bilateral  contacts  with  Japan 
to try to  extract  some  advantage,  narrowly  defined,  for  themselves. 
10.  If the balance-sheet  were  now  to  be  drawn  up  with 
ruthless  honesty,  those  individual  Member  States  would  have  to  admit 
that their bilateral  efforts have  brought  them  little or nothing  beyond 
•  what  could  have  been  achieved  through  common  negotiations. 
11.  This  bilateralism is all very  regrettable,  and  no 
signHicant  and  lasting  improvement·  is  likely so  long  as  it persists; 
• 
but  what  I  find even  more  astonishing  is that  some  people  in  the 
Japanese  administration and  industry  seem  to cling  to  the notion that 
it is  in  Japan's  interest  to  keep  the  Community  divided.  I  have  the 
impression  that  they  are  becoming  less  numerous  or  less  vocal;  but  if 
there  are  any  left,  I  would  say  to  them  that  there  will  be  no 
tiberalisation of existing  national  quantitative restrictions on 7 ( 
·.I 
'  , 
.  ' 
,. 
/ 
EEC  reguest  list 
15.  As  you  know,  the  Community  presented a  list of 
requests  to  the  Japanese  Go~ernmcnt on  9  December,  calling  for 
continued effective moderation  of  Japanese  exports  to  the  Community 
in sensitive sectors,  and  calling  for  specific steps  to  open  up  the 
Japanese  market  to  imports  from  the  Community.  This  list was  not 
exhaustive,  but ·was  reduced  to  the  most  urgent  practical  measures. 
16.  Next  week,  on  29  January,  there  will  be  an  important 
Community  mission  to  Tokyo  led  by  Sir  Roy  Denman  to  receive  the  Japanese 
Government's  reply  to  these  requests.  Unfortunately,  I  cannot  say  that 
•  I  expect  very  impressive  results,  despite  the urgency  of the  Community's 
~  requests. 
17.  On  30  November,  Prime  Minister  Suzuki  issued a 
-·-~  ·- statement  making  it clear that  he  intended-to use  every possible efiort  ~ 
to  resolve  the  question of  economic  friction with  other countries.  He 
set  up  a research  committee  within the  Liberal  Democratic  Party under 
the  Party President,  to  tackle the problems  of opening  the  Japanese 
market  to "correct"  non-tariff barriers,  and  to accelerate tariff cuts 
agreed under  the  Tokyo  Round.  This  was  a  very  encouraging  statement. 8
•• 
18.  Five  months  earlier, on  14  July,  Mr.  Tanaka  then 
19. 
MITI  Minister  issued  a  statement  that  Japan  would  seek  economic  growth 
by  expansion of  domestic  demand,  and  saying  that  he  "  •••  keenly 
realized that  it is necessary  to  further  expand  the  imports  of 
manufactured  goods'
1
•  He  called upon  the  Japanese  business  coml'!lunity" 
to  make  further  efforts  to J'romote  imports  of manufactured  goods",  nnd 
added  that  it wns  "  •••  important  to  encourage  industrial  cooperJtion, 
such  as  investm~nt activities,  in order  to  further  promote  broader 
~ooperatiye relationships  with  foreign  industries."  This  also  was  a 
very  encouraging  statement. 
Looking  at  the  specific  actions  that  have  already 
been  announced;  the  accelerated  Tokyo  Round  tariff  cuts  are  welcome 
in themselves,  but  cannot  possibly bring  about  the  growth  in  imports 
required_ merely  to  prevent  the  trade  imbalance  getting  steadily worse. 
The  EC  request  list  call.cd  explicitly  for· tariff reductions  "  of  a 
substantial  character,  going  beyond  the  concessions  agreed  in  the  Tokyo 
Round  where  these apply,  and  implemented  at  an  early date".  Seen  in 
this light,  the  acceleration of the  Tokyo  Round  cuts  amounts  to  a 
rejection of the.EC  requests.  Early  signals on  non-tariff barriers 
I 
..... 
referred to  min1~al measures  in only  four  of the  many  areas  covered  in 
.': 
our  request  list.  I  hope  that. ~ext  week  these early signals will  prove 
to have  been  wrong,  but  I  fear  they  may  be  right. 9
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20.  Of  course,  I  do  not  for  one  moment  doubt  the good 
faith of  Mr.  Suzuki  or  his  ministers,  but  there  seems  to  be  an 
inherent  and  very  solid resistance  to  change  built  in to  the  Japanese 
system  of  government  and  ad~inistration.  This  is all  the  more  under-
standable,  since  the  system  has  brought  Japan  to  an  enviable position 
of strength,  growth,  full  employment,  and  low  inflation,  while  the  rest 
of the  world  is  struggling  with  the  worst  economic  crisis  in  half  a 
century.  Unfortunately,  the  success of the  Japanese  system  may  act 
like a  very  high  sp~ed gyroscope,  and  make  it difficult  for  the 
authorities  to  change  course  in  time  in order  to avert  a  disastrous 
clash  with  the major  trading partners. 
Outlook  for  1982  and  beyond 
21.  The  ge!_'leral  outlook  for  ~982 and  later,  as  described 
by  the  OECD,  is  to  say  the  least,  discouraging.  In  the  circumstances 
it is obvious  H1:2t  we  in the  Community  wilt have  to  pay  close attention 
to  industrial  PG~icy if  we  are  to  come  through  the  next  few  years  in  a 
reasonably  good  ~ondition to  expand  whenever  possible.  It  is  equally 
obvious  that  we  cannnt  allow  our  industrial  development  tQ  be  constrain~d  ., 
or dictated. from  outside.  We  must  not  throw  away  our  own  freedom  of 
...... 
'• 
action  in the name  of  some  vagu~·ror more  general  freedom  that  helps 
no-one. 10
22.  For  example,. the  steel crisis,  now  several  years 
old,  was  created  by  faulty  evaluation of the world  market,  and  the 
corresponding  errors of optimism  and  overcapacity.  This  is  why  the 
Steel  ~ommittee set  up  in  th~  OECD  is  important.  Japan  plays  a 
prominent  part  in this  Committee.  It exists to prevent  a  recurrence 
of the  expensive  and  painful  errors of the  past  and  meanwhile  to 
·spread  the  burden  of  adjustment  with  as  little disruption as  possible 
to  the tradition;l  flows  of  trade  in  steel  products.  tt  is  a  ratior.al 
response  to  a  highly  ~ndesirable situation  • 
..  ..  ---·  -·-·--- .  -- --- ---
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23.  A further  example  is the  shipbuilding  industry,  where  again  the  OECD  has 
provided  a  forum  where  the major  shipbuilding  nations  could  try to deal 
rationally  with  the  problems  of overcapacity.  Here  again,  Japan  plays a 
central  part.  If, indeed,  the  burden  has  been  shared  in  a  reasonabte balanced 
fashion  over  the period 1978-79,  recent  developments  are  rather disquieting. 
The  Japanese  authorities  have  released  partof the  pressure they decided  to 
exercise on  their  shipbuilders.  As  a  result, Japanese  shipyards  have  merely 
artttlciaLly and  henceforth  dangerously  anticipated market  conditions  in  1980 
and  in  th~ first part  of  1981.  As  ~  matter  of  fact,  the trend on  the  world 
market  for  ships  shows  no  upward  movement,  on  the  contrary!  Therefo~ the 
hightevel  EC/Japan  talks  due  next  week  in  Tokyo  will  see  the  Commission 
24. 
clearly  stating  its disapproval  of  the  further  loosening  of  control of  shipyards, 
the  Japanese  Government  announced  for  1982. 
If this  were  to  be  confirmed,  it would  undoubtedly  put  a  severe  strain on  the 
burden-sharing  principle established at  OECD  level  in  1976  and  jeopardize the 
efforts to  restore the  necessary  balance  between  supply  and  demand  in  the 
shipbuilding  sector. 
Voices  have  been  raised  in  Japan  to  criticise,  I  quote,  "the absence  of  restruc-
turing  measures  in  European  shipyards"!  The  truth is, we  in  Europe  have  certainl: 
thoroughly  reshaped  our  shipyards:  between  1976  and  1981  cuts  in  production 
(  - 53t)  and  in  employment  (  - 41%)  in  Europe  went  far  beyond  the Japanese 
efforts  (  - 35%  in  both  cases).  In  the  recent  past our  Japanese  partners  have 
more  than· once  claimed  a  35%  cut  in  production  capacities,  compared  with  a  25% 
cut  for  Europea·n  shipyards:  in  fact,  the  Japanese  figures only  relate to the 
60  largest  companies  and  do  not  give  any  ~ndicat~on as  to evolution of  capacitie 
of  the 600  odd  smaller  companies  involved. 
Our  Japanese  friends,  on  the other  hand,  have  a  wry  smile  when  they  complain 
about  aids  granted  to  the  European  shipyards.  In.  fact,  the  joke is on  us:  indeed 
financial  support  in  favour  of  the  Japanese  shipyards, for  the  fiscal  year  1981 
only, meant  an  incredibly  high  ratio of  55%  of  construction costs.  At  the  same 
time,  we  have  started dismantling  the  aid  schemes  in .favour  of  European  shipyard 
The  Japanese  financial  support  has  given  birth  to  an  artificial  increase of  the 
demands  for  ships  regardless  of  the  real  conditions prevailing  on  the  market, 
whereas  aid~ going  to  European  shipyards  have  been  thoroughly  controlled  in  orde 
to stick  to  the  market  realities.  The  result  is clearly shown:  the  share  o~r 
shipyards  have  taken  on  the  market  shows  a  downward  trend. 
With  the  spread of the "world  car"  concept,  continued 
structural  adaptation,  and  with  a  growing  number  of  Euro-Japanese  joint 
yentueres,  we  may  be  able  to  avoid  the  worst  consequences  of  imbalance 12
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25.  In  fields  o~ rapid growth  and  advanced  technology 
such  as  micro-electronics,  computer  software,  nuclear  energy,  remote 
. ' 
sensing  we  may  be  able  to  hO~e that  a  new  spirit  may  emerge  in 
•.(.:  .  . 
relations between  the  Community  and  Japan  :  not  merely  one  of  more  or 
.  ',  .. '.' 
less  uncomfor.table  coexistence_,  but  one  of  co-operation and  mutual 
.  ~  ·.  'tt.  -·  . 
reinforcement.  BOth  sides  eould  derive enormous  benefits,  and  old 
·,···  i 
suspicions  would  fade  &1l8>'• 
26.  The  m,eeting  last week  at  Cay  Biscayne  confirmed  that 
27. 
Japan  is ware  of the•need ·to ·reduce  trade frictions,  and  indeed,  we,  ~ 
look  to  Japan  to  play  its full  r5le in the management  of  world  economic 
affairs  • 
• 
In  the  short  term,  however,  we  have  an  acute  problem, 
and  next  week  in  Tok)'o  we·· shall  see  whether·  t~·  ~·  Japanese  Government  can  .  ~  ~ ·. 
introduce  us  to a  new  kind  of economic  miracle: 
I 
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